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The global economic and political order that was created in the aftermath of 
World War II –an order that has been of enormous benefit to the entire world-- is 
under attack by President Trump.  That order has provided conditions for the 
enormous growth of emerging markets and the moving out of poverty of hundreds 
of millions of people.   
That order is supported now by an effective set of institutions that, even if 
they could not have been created without US engagement, institutions have taken 
on a life of their own.  We have created a system of global governance without 
global government.  These institutions can help the world maintain an open yet 
regulated trading and financial system, even if the US withdraws into its shell, or 
decides to take actions which violate its obligations.   
The rules of the US give the president some, but limited discretion.  The 
limitations have been evidenced by the challenges to the President’s executive 
orders on immigration.  In trade, the President has considerable discretion in the 
aggressiveness with which it pursues protectionism actions based on anti-dumping, 
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countervailing duties, safeguards, currency manipulation, etc.  Both the processes
governing those actions and the challenges to them are slow.  Countries affected 
by those actions can challenge them within the WTO, but also have, of course, 
similar discretion in the aggressiveness with which they respond to those 
measures.  The WTO was established to create a rules based global trading order, 
one which would avoid trade wars and which disputes could be resolved within a 
rule-of-law.  The system has worked well, though it advantages large countries at 
the expense of small.  The US has announced as a matter of policy that it would 
ignore adverse rulings.  Whether it would actually do so is another matter.  While 
certain parts of the American economy, like rust-belt workers, have suffered, the 
economy as a whole, and especially US corporations, have benefited from the 
system; the problem is not the international trade system but the failure of the US 
to deal adequately with the challenges posed by the distributive consequences of 
trade and technology.   
The US administration seems also to lack an economic understanding of 
basic principles governing trade.  It is the multilateral trade deficit that matters, 
not the bilateral deficit.  The multilateral trade deficit is determined by macro-
economics—the gap between domestic savings and investment.  The budgetary 
policies advocated by Trump, if adopted, would increase the trade deficit.  These 
outcomes are achieved through an adjustment of the dollar.  Speeches by the 
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President are unlikely to affect that value for anything greater than a few days, or 
a few minutes.  Protectionist measures, while having but minimal effects on the 
overall deficit, are likely to lead to greater appreciation of the dollar.  With 
emerging markets holding large amounts of dollar denominated debt, this may 
lead to global instability. 
If there is a fault with global trade agreements, it is not that the US trade 
negotiators didn’t get what they wanted.  It was that they wanted the wrong thing.  
TPP illustrates.  It was designed to break up global supply chains operating with 
China playing a pivotal role.  When the US government calculated its net effect on 
GDP, the impacts were miniscule—even when fully implemented, of the order 
of .15% of GDP.  More accurate estimates suggested smaller or even negative 
impacts.   
It is important for the US, China, and the entire world that the damage of the 
Trump aberration in US policy be minimized.  Just by reminding companies and 
countries that borders matter a lot, the damage inflicted on the global economy is 
likely to be deep and long lasting.    China’s response should be guided by the 
following principles. 
1. Take high road, even if Trump takes the low.  This means respond 
within the international rule of law—even if the US announces it will ignore 
WTO rulings. 
446
2. Recognized that trade is a positive sum multilateral game.  Trump’s 
policy will open up new avenues of cooperation with other countries. China 
can, for instance, help create a high speed train system for Mexico.  Potentially 
linking the Atlantic and Pacific, such a scheme could be part of a New World silk 
route, providing faster and less costly linkages between the Atlantic coast of Latin 
America and China.  Be creative about the new opportunities this affords.  China 
appears to be doing this already, with the China Regional Comprehensive 
Partnership Agreement as a replacement for TPP. 
3. Take an active role in supporting existing international institutions 
and arrangements, helping fill the void created by the US withdrawal.  The 
US may go so far as to condition support for certain institutions like the World 
Bank or the UN engaging in policies that it dictates.  Multilateralism means that 
no country can dictate what these institutions do.   It will be important for China 
to provide the requisite financial support.  China has already been active in the 
establishment of new multilateral institutions, like the New Development Bank 
(the so-called BRICIS bank) and AIIB (the Asia Infrastructure Bank).  
4. Respond in a way which is consistent with a rule of law.   
5. Look for areas of cooperation with the US.
6. But be resolute and act deliberatively.  Trump wants fast results.  
Haste makes for waste.  Do not be bullied into acting quickly. What is at stake 
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is not just the China-US relation, but the entire rules based system governing the 
international order.  If a large country can bully another large country, imagine 
what the large country would do vis-à-vis a smaller country. 
7. Take advantage of the opportunity provided for China to advance its own 
agenda.  China already is engaged in a transition from export led growth to 
domestically demand driven growth.  Trump’s policies will only hasten that 
inevitable shift.
8. Go for the long play: One of the weaknesses in “capitalism and politics 
with American characteristics” is its short-sightedness. As China forges its 
response, it should do so pursuing an “enlightened self-interest.” China has an 
interest in preserving a rules based open international system.   
The global geo-economic and geo-political order of the 21st century would, 
in any case, have to be different from that created in the aftermath of the Second 
World War.  Trump’s actions have only hastened the change, increasing the 
urgency for such change.  That new order will be a much more multi-polar world.   
This short note has described some of the ways that China might respond in 
ways which support the creation of this new 21st century globalization—a
globalization which will continue to support the growth of countries and the 
improvements in the standards of living of citizens all over the world.   
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Rethinking Globalization in the Trump Era: 
US-China Relations 
Joseph E. Stiglitz1
The global economic and political order that was created in the aftermath of 
World War II is under attack by President Trump.  That order has been of 
enormous benefit to the entire world.  The first half of the twentieth century was 
one of the worst:  two world wars and a Great Depression.  Though the second 
half has not been without conflict, there have not been the great conflagrations 
that marked the previous half century.  The era of colonialism was brought to an 
end, as hundreds of millions could once against determine their own destiny.  And 
while there have been economic fluctuations, none of the downturns has come 
anywhere near that of the Great Depression.  Hundreds of millions were moved 
out of poverty—500 million in China alone.  Parts of the world that had been 
mired in stagnation and poverty for centuries saw unprecedented growth.   
The international institutions and arrangements that have been created the 
last seventy years have, I believe, played an important role in these successes. 
These include the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the regional development banks, 
and GATT and its successor institution, WTO.  None of these are perfect.  Indeed, 
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in many of my books I have criticized them—as not democratic enough, too 
dominated by the US and other advanced countries, too influenced by special 
interests and particular ideologies.  But I criticized them from the perspective not 
of walking away from globalization, but from that of making it work better, to the 
betterment of all individuals around the world.   
Seemingly, President Trump is arguing for a new era of protectionism.  I say 
seemingly, because there is a lack of consistency in his statements and some of 
those he has appointed.  But in his recent message to the US Congress, he reiterate 
the protectionist themes that dominated the election, and it would be wise for 
countries to orientate their policies around the possibility, or even likelihood, that 
he will, to at least a certain extent, carry out his promises.  These measures 
include a tariff of some 45% against China, a renegotiation of NAFTA, and a 
tariff against Mexico of some 20%.   
The world is lucky:  it has in place an effective set of international 
institutions.  Some would argue that without the US, it would have been difficult 
to create these institutions.  Doing so required a global public spirit that is not 
always present—the times in which most of the institutions were created were 
unique, the moment of solidarity as World War II was being brought to a close, or 
that following the fall of the Iron Curtain.  But these institutions have taken on a 
life of their own.  We have created a system of global governance without global 
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government.  These institutions can help the world maintain an open yet regulated 
trading and financial system, even if the US withdraws into its shell, or decides to 
take actions which violate its obligations.   
In the following pages, after describing briefly the scope for action of the 
President, I suggest how countries, such as China could and should respond. 
The scope for action 
Though the President has been given considerable authority for acting in 
areas of international affairs, he still faces many constraints. The extent to which 
he will be constrained remains a subject of controversy among legal scholars in 
the US.  The fact that this is so itself creates considerable uncertainty going 
forward.    
For instance, while there may be some debate about whether the President on 
his own can withdraw the US from NAFTA, even were he to do so, the 
implementing legislation (which was, in effect, the Congressional ratification of 
NAFTA) remains on the books, and that sets tariffs and other terms of US trade 
relations with Canada and Mexico.  That could only be changed by an act of 
Congress.  It was the Republican President Bush who negotiated NAFTA, and 
Republicans have consistently supported trade agreements.  It would be a 
remarkable abnegation of principle if the Republicans, who now control both 
houses of Congress, were to vote against NAFTA. 
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Even then, WTO remains in place.  In the case of Mexico, the provisions of 
WTO (including those ensuring its “most favored nation treatment”—that the US 
cannot impose tariffs on Mexico any higher than those on other countries) mean 
that Mexico would face negligible tariffs; and indeed, Mexico would be able to 
charge the US higher tariffs than US could charge Mexico. 
This, of course, oversimplifies:  there are other actions, such as non-tariff 
barriers (phyto-sanitary conditions for agriculture) that the US could apply.  And 
the US could break its WTO obligations.  Some point out that it takes years for a 
WTO case to be adjudicated.  At the same time, countries harmed by US actions 
are not likely to wait to take direct retaliatory actions, e.g. impose countervailing 
duties, undoing the benefit that the US might have hoped to have gained from the 
action; or indirect retaliatory actions, e.g. in areas not covered by existing trade 
agreements (government procurement). 
The US could even withdraw from the WTO.  Doing so would, of course, 
require another vote of both houses of Congress. 
Within the WTO framework, there are a variety of protectionist actions the 
US could take—dumping duties and countervailing duties.  To impose these, the 
US must go through certain procedures (which are time consuming).  These 
procedures are also unfair—highly biased against other countries.  And the US has, 
in fact, lost cases when countries against which it imposed these non-tariff barriers 
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have appealed to the WTO.   
Historically, they have been especially unfair to China, because there were 
special provisions applying to non-market economies that enable the levying of 
especially high dumping duties.  These special provisions were supposed to have 
already expired, but the US is claiming otherwise.  There is a case on this matter 
now before the WTO.   
Even when the US engages in a WTO-non-compliant action, the WTO does 
not prohibit the US from continuing these actions; it only allows the aggrieved 
country to apply compensatory duties.  Countries have learned how to direct their 
retaliatory actions in ways which have the most political effect—targeting goods 
which are politically sensitive, often in districts of influential Congressmen.  In 
most cases, these compensatory duties have the desired effect—the country 
engaging in the non-compliant action changes its policy. 
In short, the US could impose tariffs against selected products from China, if 
it follows certain procedures; and it could simply ignore its WTO obligations. In 
either case, it risks retaliation, a subject which I shall discuss further below.   
The WTO was designed to try to prevent trade wars.  If the US were to 
impose a WTO-non-compliant tariff, and China won its WTO case, it could and 
presumably would impose compensatory actions to the extent authorized.  That 
was supposed to end the matter.  The US wouldn’t (or shouldn’t) respond by then 
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taking a further action.  But, of course, it’s hard to know how a President who 
simply breaks America’s obligations might act.
Consequences 
President Trump has focused on bilateral trade deficits.  Economists have 
long argued that what matters is multilateral trade deficit—we’ve moved away 
from simple barter, because doing so allows us to have higher standards of living.  
(One of the weaknesses of the old Soviet model was that it too was focused on 
bilateral trade deficits.)  And, of course, the US-China trade deficit is large. 
But even were the US to impose tariffs on China, it would not have any 
significant effect on its multilateral trade deficit—that is affected by macro-
economics, by the level of domestic investments and savings.  A tariff against 
China simply diverts trade to some other developing country or emerging markets.  
Production won’t, for the most part, come back to the US.  And when it does 
come back, it won’t bring back the jobs that were lost (mostly to technology, 
though some to trade.)  The new production will be highly capital intensive, and 
likely in a different places from those where jobs were lost. 
Thus, the tariffs won’t lead to more jobs:  they will lead to lower standards of 
living.  And if the new protectionism sets off a trade war, the effects on living 
standards will be all the greater. 
Responding 
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While it is thus foolish for the US to engage in the New Protectionism, it 
won’t be the first time countries with populist demagogues have undertaken 
counterproductive policies.  The question facing the rest of the world is, how 
should they respond?  It is important that any response be guided by a sound 
understanding of the underlying economics. 
Underlying economic principles 
Trump seems to argue that trade is a zero sum game, and America’s 
negotiators have gotten a bad deal.  The central lesson of trade theory is that trade 
is a positive sum game—that when the rules are written correctly, both countries 
as a whole are better off.   
But what was not noted as much as it should, is that there can be large 
distributive consequences—some individuals within the country can be worse off, 
even if the country as a whole is better off.  The winners could have compensated 
the losers, but often they do not.  And when the losers are very numerous—as 
they have been in the US—and they are those who already are among those not 
doing well, then trade will be viewed badly.  It is not that the US trade negotiators 
negotiated badly; they got most of what they wanted.  It is that they were 
bargaining for the wrong thing.  They were pursuing the interests of America’s 
large financial institutions and corporations.   
Thus, Trump has tried to make the issue a North-South one:  the developing 
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countries out bargained the US.  In the face of it, to anyone who has watched trade 
bargaining, this accusation (leveled against his own party) is absurd.  So too for 
anyone who understands bargaining theory.  For years, I have written how the 
trade agreements have been unfair to developing countries.     
But it is true that large swaths of those in the developed countries have not 
done well, and that’s because (a) the distributive effects of the agreements, 
especially as shaped by corporate interests, have been large, outweighing any 
growth gains (even if the size of the pie increases, if they get a smaller share, they 
can be worse off); these distributive effects are not just those predicted by the 
standard theory of comparative advantage (the famous Samuelson-Stolper 
theorem), with trade in goods substituting movement of factors, so that the 
demand for unskilled labor if advanced countries declines with the opening of 
trade, and with that its wage; but also include those arising from weakened 
workers’ bargaining power, as firms threaten to relocate if workers do not accept 
lower wages or worse working conditions.  And (b) the aggregative effects have 
been overestimated—and when trade agreements have been mismanaged, even 
negative.  Estimates, for instance, of the effect of TPP after being fully 
implemented in some 15 years have ranged from a miniscule .15% of GDP (the 
official government estimate) to negative (a Tufts University study).  Standard 
models, based on the theories of comparative advantage, show a (possibly very 
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small) positive gain.  But the standard model leaves out four important factors:  (a) 
risk—trade can increase in risk, and in the absence of a full set of insurance 
markets, the net effect on GDP and well-being can be negative.  Indeed, everyone, 
in all countries, could be worse off 2 ; (b) employment—the standard model 
assumes full employment; in reality, there are often large departures from full 
employment.  Trade agreements that are not well managed can result in jobs being 
destroyed faster than new jobs are created.  The welfare consequences of these 
macro-economic effects typically swamp the small gains associated with 
comparative advantage, especially when tariffs are already relatively low.  While 
this problem is rampant in developing countries3, it arises even in developed 
countries like the US.  (c) Monopoly and imperfections of competition.  Standard 
theory has been predicated on there being fully competitive markets in all 
countries. In fact, imperfections of competition are pervasive, and there is 
evidence of increasing market concentration across a wide swath of industries.  
The competitive model seems increasingly irrelevant in providing a good 
description of the economy, and accordingly, analyses based on the gains from 
trade using models assuming competition are suspect.   Traditionally, trade has 
been thought to increase competition, as it brings more competitors into the 
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market place.  But more recently, it has become evident that it may provide more 
scope for the development of global monopolists and monoposonists.  A firm with 
monopsony power in one country can use the advantages gotten there to 
outperform smaller firms in other countries.  (d) Managed trade.  The so-called 
free-trade agreements are really managed trade agreements, and managed, as I 
suggested, more for large corporate interests than for the interests of society as a 
whole.  This is especially so of the investment and IPR (intellectual property 
rights) provisions of these agreements.  The former, for instance, restricts 
country’s ability to impose necessary regulations for health, safety, the 
environment, or even financial and economic stability; the latter typically includes 
provisions which favor big pharma over generic medicines, and corporate 
innovators over small innovating firms.  
Thus, what Trump and some others have framed as a North South battle over 
trade is more a distributive battle—but not a distributive battle of the gains of 
trade between North and South, but a distributive battle between workers and 
corporations, or more broadly, the  “1%.”  Interestingly, adverse distributional 
effects have also occurred in some developing countries. 
Principles that should guide China’s response
Below, I list ten a set of principles designed to enhance to create a more 
stable and efficient multi-polar system of global governance, which in turn can 
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contribute to a stronger global economy, in which there is greater equity.   
1. Take high road, even if Trump takes the low.  This means respond 
within the international rule of law, even if the US actions seem counter to the 
spirit, and even the letter, of the law.  There are many areas not governed by WTO 
commitments, e.g. government procurement.   
2. Recognized that trade is a positive sum multilateral game.  Trump’s 
failure to recognize this—to view it as a zero sum game and to focus on bilateral 
relations (including the bilateral trade deficit)—are among the key failings in his 
trade policy.  Indeed, the move away from globalization is likely to turn out to be 
negative-sum.  There have been significant cost savings from the creation of 
global supply chain; the disruption of these global supply chains will be costly.   
Trump’s policy will open up new avenues of cooperation.  Other countries, 
such as Mexico, have been victimized by Trump.  Others that have not are 
worried that they might be.  After striving for three quarters of a century to create 
a world where, for purposes of economic prosperity, borders don’t matter, the 
Trump Administration has reverse course 180 degrees.  Countries around the 
world will be forging new alliances and strengthening old.   China has the skills 
and resources to help others.  It can help create a high speed train system for 
Mexico.  Potentially linking the Atlantic and Pacific, such a scheme could be 
part of a New World silk route, providing faster and less costly linkages 
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between the Atlantic coast of Latin America and China.   
China has already been active in the establishment of new multilateral 
institutions, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New 
Development Bank (the BRICS Bank), which open up new opportunities for 
South-South cooperation and provide new resources for addressing global 
problems like climate change.   
3. Respond in a way which is consistent with a rule of law.  One of the 
most disturbing aspects of what Trump has done since taking office is the 
wholesale breaking of the rule of law.  If one believes it is bad policy for 
American firms to invest abroad, one passes laws to that effect, for instance tax 
laws to disincentivize individuals from doing so, or regulations that prohibit them 
from doing so.  It is then the responsibility of the executive branch to enforce 
those laws in a fair way, not selective enforcement, e.g. against firms with which 
the executive branch has a disagreement.  Trump picks on particular firms to 
tweet, twists their arm publicly to do what he wants them to do, then, in return for 
doing so, seemingly arbitrarily and capriciously awards them tax incentives not 
available to others.  All of the elements of this selective policy run against the 
principle of the rule of law.  Responding in a way which is consistent with both a 
national and international rule of law still provides ample scope for effective 
action.
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Thus, it might be tempting to respond to US actions which violate WTO 
rules by taking actions, like special levies, against American firms, especially 
those which are highly dependent on China as a source of profits.  Such a 
temptation should be resisted.  
4. Look for areas of cooperation—reminding Trump that the US-China 
relationship is about more than trade.  The US, for instance, is rightly very 
concerned about North Korea.  Many believe that China is the only country that 
has much leverage over that country.  There are many other areas where the US 
and China could cooperate—China has the knowledge and capital to invest in key 
elements of the infrastructure that the US needs, such as high speed railroads.  
Unfortunately, I would not hold out much hope for this kind of economic 
cooperation:  Trump and many members of his team often show isolationist 
sentiments, and it is questionable whether they would be receptive to this kind of 
cooperative investment.  (Similarly, any offer by China to buy currently 
proscribed hi-tech products—which would help correct the bilateral trade 
deficit—are likely to fall on deaf ears.) 
5. But be resolute—Trump is a bully , has no sense of fairness, decency, or 
fair play and giving in will only lead to more unreasonable demands, as he “smells” 
weakness, though, that he may feel no boundaries to his actions.  Some interpret 
his early actions put in doubt his commitment to the One China policy as part of 
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his long run bargaining game—if China does not take actions to curtail exports, he 
will make China’s life in other areas difficult.   China’s forceful response was 
helpful:  the One China policy was not up for debate.  But China may have to 
respond in kind, broadening responses beyond just those involving economics.   
It is quite possible that the Trump administration will use the Reagan rule-
book, putting pressure on China to impose voluntary export restraints, threatening 
to impose trade restraints on Japan if it didn’t.  (Though voluntary export 
restraints were not really voluntary.)   Japan gave in.  But Japan was totally 
dependent on the US for its defense, and had a special relationship with the US 
going back to the surrender at the end of World War II.  It would do enormous 
damage to the rules-based global trade regime were China to accede to Trump’s 
demand.  Why wouldn’t the larger country facing a trade deficit with any other 
country make a similar demand on its weaker trading partner?   
Trump thinks of trade as a simple deal, like a real estate deal.  He doesn’t 
fully understand governments only set the rules and regulations.  It is the private 
sector that makes the decisions. And, as I suggested earlier, it is the underlying 
macro-economics that largely determines the overall trade deficit; and it that, not 
the bilateral trade deficit that matters.  Indeed, protectionist measures not only are 
likely to lead to a lower standard of living, but also lead to an appreciation of the 
dollar—and the appreciation of the dollar could lead to global macro-economic 
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instability.   
As he contemplates launching a global trade war, his calculus is like that of a 
general counting his tanks in comparison with the enemies. He looks at the trade 
deficit, and infers from that that China is more dependent on the US than the other 
way around.   But matters are far more complicated than this simplistic analysis 
would suggest.  Certainly, America’s workers will be badly hurt—and for what?  
There is dissension in the US about Trump’s policies because among economists 
there is almost unanimity:  his analysis of trade and globalization is wrong, and so 
too for his seeming analysis of the consequences of a trade war.  This is 
particularly true because China already is engaged in a transition from 
export led growth to domestically demand driven growth.  Trump’s policies 
will only hasten that inevitable shift. Moreover, as Trump has antagonized 
former friends of the US all over the world, there are new alliances (discussed 
below) to be forged, e.g. with Latin America and Europe.  China is sitting on a 
large amount of reserves.  China has far more instruments available to enable it 
both to absorb the shock and redirect the economy.  Any trade war would have 
very adverse effects on particular sectors and regions in the US economy, and the 
fiscally constrained US government would be hard pressed to provide the 
assistance that they require.  China has shown in the past the ability to target 
responsive actions in ways which maximize impacts, including on politics and 
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economics.  Trump has focused his attention on manufacturing, which employs 
but 8% of America’s workforce.  Agriculture has disproportionate political 
influence.  Some Congressional districts are particularly dependent on exports.  
Moreover, the Republican Congress has consistently opposed trade assistance for 
those adversely affected by trade shocks.  To provide that now would be again a 
major reversal of policy.  While “consistency is the hobgoblin of small minds,”
America’s political process is slow, and this makes the timely provision of the 
needed help even more problematic. 
It is true, of course, as we noted earlier, that there are certain groups that 
have been hurt by globalization, and a succession of American administrations 
should have done more to help these individuals.  The fault lies in the US not 
providing sufficient help to those who have been on the losing side of 
globalization.  But the New Protectionism will not help these, and will create a 
new set individuals who see their standards of living falling—the very large 
number of individuals hurt by the New Protectionism.  
6. Go for the long play:  what will advance the interests of the global 
economy and China over the long term.  Trump has made a great deal that from 
now on, US will put America First.  Recognize that the US has always put 
“America first,” but previously, it was an enlightened self-interest, that saw peace, 
stability, and cooperation in countries around the world in America’s interest.
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Trump has taken out the word enlightened from enlightened self-interest.  One of 
the weaknesses in “capitalism and politics with American characteristics” is 
its short-sightedness. China could not have gotten where it has if it had not taken 
the long view—and it should do that here as well.   
Part of the “long play” is understanding where the majority of American 
people stand.  It is natural for governments to want to work together, and thus for 
the government of China to want to do things that please the Trump 
administration.  I saw a similar dynamic at play during the Bush Administration, 
as it put pressure on countries to join the misguided War on Iraq.  I reminded the 
foreign minister of one country debating whether to join the US led effort of the 
strong opposition to that war by the majority of young people in the United 
States—and it is these people that one would have to deal with in the future.  If 
pleasing the Bush Administration entailed engendering the antipathy of the next 
generation of America’s leaders, it was a bad bargain.  This kind of analysis is 
even more relevant today.  Trump not only got fewer votes than Clinton, but he 
was elected with fewer votes than Romney received as he went into defeat.  Voter 
support for a new president is typically high—there is a honeymoon.  Even this 
early in his presidency, support for Trump is remarkably low.   
As China forges its response, it should do so pursuing an “enlightened self-
interest.” China has an interest in preserving a rules based open 
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international system. At Davos, President Xi was widely seen as taking up the 
mantel of being the champion of globalization.  But China will only be able to 
exercise leadership if it is seen as doing so within this broader perspective.  And 
its leadership will be more credible the more it is seen as following a rule of law 
within its own country.   
7. Smart negotiations includes identifying what it that Trump wants is.  Often 
it seems that more than anything, he wants a good headline, an understandable 
“story” of how he is delivering what he has promised.  Thus, he focuses on getting 
a large firm which is thinking of moving a production line to Mexico to agree 
publicly not to do so.  He can claim that he has saved 1000 jobs.  Meanwhile, his 
actions have led to an increase in the value of the dollar, and the loss of jobs that 
results outweighs by a multiple this small gain in jobs.  But the very visibility of 
the concessions he seeks makes negotiations often next to impossible.  He wants 
Mexico to agree to pay for the wall—a wall which most experts agree would be an 
enormous waste of money.  No Mexican government that agreed to that would 
survive.  A standard lesson in negotiations theory is that one has to design one’s 
demands so that there can be an agreement in which both sides can claim that they 
won, that they at least got some of what they wanted, and that their concessions 
were, in some sense, a reasonable quid pro quo.  Each side must save face.  
Trump’s ego often seems to preclude this as an outcome.  He not only sees the 
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humiliation of others not just as part of a bargaining strategy ex ante but as part of 
the outcome which he seeks.  To the extent that that is so, there cannot be a 
successful outcome to inter-governmental negotiations.  This is, of course, 
markedly different from “normal” negotiations.  Americans have come to 
understand that this is not a normal presidency.  Other countries will have to 
realize that this is so as well.   
8. Seize the opportunity of working with other countries to create a sounder, 
multi-polar multi-lateral international architecture, based on the rule of law.  
This will necessitate all countries ceding some sovereignty.  There will be 
disputes, and there needs to be some public judicial system for adjudicating 
disputes—not the private arbitrary arbitration system used under bilateral 
investment agreements that has righty been so criticized.  The rules will need to 
go beyond trade narrowly defined:  not paying for the environmental damage 
inflicted is a hidden subsidy like any wage subsidy and a fair trade agreement has 
to proscribe such subsidies.  But the principle of subsidiarity should prevail:  trade 
agreements should not intrude in areas where they need not, where there is no 
compelling case for standardization, no compelling cross-border externality.   
While the US has upheld an international rule of law, it has been a biased 
rule of law, favoring America and America’s corporate interests.  This is an 
opportunity for countries with leadership potential to seize that leadership, to 
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reconstruct a new multi-polar global order based on fairness and social justice.  
This new social order should be based on the principal of adhesion—any country 
willing to play by the rules can join the club.  In four years’ time, when America 
may be willing to rejoin the community of responsible nations, with a renewed 
commitment to honor its commitments, and to act cooperatively to solve the 
problems facing the world,  it can decide to participate in the newly crafted 
architecture.   
9. Act deliberatively.  Trump wants fast results.  Haste makes for waste.  
Do not be bullied into acting quickly. Trade agreements are complex, and have 
often unanticipated effects on various parts of the economy.  The President on his 
own cannot pull the country out of the WTO.  It would take a vote of both houses 
of Congress, and that is not likely to happen.  On his own, he can impose certain 
measures (anti-dumping, countervailing duties, safeguards), but even then, there is 
a procedure that must be followed, and if that procedure is not followed, and if 
actions are taken that are not consistent with the law, there is a presumption of 
judicial relief.  And then, China has within its purview a host of countervailing 
and retaliatory measures, which would make clear to all the benefits of 
maintaining good (normal) trade relations. 
In particular, the US may be tempted to try to get China to agree to voluntary 
export restraints, which seemingly worked so well against Japan during the 
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Reagan era.  But as we noted earlier, the world has changed enormously since 
then, and there are large differences between Japan’s situation and that of China.  
Global supply chains have become enormously important.  The trade deficit with 
Japan could be remedied by restraints on a relatively few products.  Most 
importantly, China has been making a move to a market economy.  Imposing 
trade restraints would be an enormously counter-productive move in the other 
direction.  And again, as noted above, it won’t really solve the underlying US 
problem associated with its multilateral trade deficit, which will probably grow 
worse under Trump’s policies.  Given that, one cannot expect a quick turn-around 
in US attitudes.  (Trump continues to talk about China’s currency manipulation, 
even though China’s intervention in the exchange rate in recent years has been to 
support the value of the currency.  So too, Trump continues to talk about Mexican 
immigration, as if it is a major problem, even though there has been reverse 
migration in recent years, and China has been helping the US stem the wave of 
migrants from Central America.)   
If China were to intervene, it should do so using a market based instruments, 
such as the system of trade chits that I analyzed in The Euro and in my recent 
NBER paper.4  When any firm imports a good, it receives a trade chit, and to 
                                                          
4 The Euro:  How a Common Currency Threatens the Future of Europe, New York: W.W. Norton, 2016 (in 
Chinese simplified characters by China Machine Press).  “Macro-economic Management in an Electronic 
Credit/Financial System, “NBER Working Paper 23032, January 2017. 
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export, it must buy a trade chit, which will be traded freely in the market.  This 
system separates, in effect, the trade account from the capital account.   
10. Be creative about the new opportunities this affords.  China appears to 
be doing this already, with the China Regional Comprehensive Partnership 
Agreement as a replacement for TPP. TPP illustrates much of what is wrong 
with earlier trade agreements.  It excluded China, thus threatening to disrupt 
important global supply chains.  It did little to fix the deficiencies in existing 
investment agreements and IPR—in some ways, they were made worse.  US has 
foisted on the rest of the world an IPR regime which does not even work well for 
the US as a whole.  It was, to a large extent, designed by and for the drug industry 
and a limited number of other special interests.  Intellectual property rights are 
important, but the current system needs reform.  This may be an opportune 
moment to do so.5
The set of principles that I have outlined above include many that are just 
                                                          
5 I discuss some of the broader issues in designing an innovation system for China, including what kind of 
IPR regime maximizes innovation and societal well being in “Institutional Design for China’s Innovation 
System,” in Law and Economic Development with Chinese Characteristics: Institutions for the 21st Century,
J.E. Stiglitz and  D. Kennedy (eds.), New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 247-277.  
(published in simplified Chinese by China People’s Publishing House).  See also Chapter 4 in Making 
Globalization Work, New York: WW Norton, 2006 (published in simplified Chinese by China People’s 
Publishing House) and “The Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property,” sixth annual Frey Lecture in 
Intellectual Property, Duke University, February 16, 2007, Duke Law Journal, Vol. 57, No. 6, April 2008, pp. 
1693-1724.  As America withdraws from globalization, it is also time to explore the flexibilities already 
embedded in existing agreements.   
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conventional wisdom for achieving mutually beneficial returns in any set of 
negotiations—looking for areas of cooperation, of mutual gain, and thinking about 
what is it that Trump wants. 
Concluding Remarks 
China has gained enormously from globalization and from the open global 
economic order—an order which the US did so much to create.  But history 
matters:  now that that order and the institutions which help support it have been 
created, it can continue even were the US to go in another direction.  The global 
geo-economic and geo-political order of the 21st century would, in any case, have 
to be different from that created in the aftermath of the Second World War.  
Trump’s actions have only hastened the change, increasing the urgency for 
such change.  That new order will be a much more multi-polar world. All
countries need to participate in the creation and working of that order, one based 
on social just and the international rule of law.  China, as the world’s largest 
economy (in terms of purchasing power parity), the largest trading economy, the 
largest manufacturing economy, the largest saver has an especially important role.  
It might have been better had the world move more gradually towards the New 
Order—China, in its economic reforms, has shown the advantages of gradualism 
(as opposed to shock therapy.)  But the world may not be given that choice.   
So China, and the rest of the world, should look at what is happening from 
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the perspective of the new opportunities that this rapid change will afford.  This 
short note has described some of the ways that China might respond in ways 
which support the creation of this new 21st century globalization—a
globalization which will continue to support the growth of countries and the 
improvements in the standards of living of citizens all over the world.   
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